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of-use#LAAINCOMPLETE CORRESPONDENCE:
AN  UNSENT  LETTER  TO  MARY  JOE FRUG'
Martha Minow*
Dear Mary Joe:
I think A  Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto is  bold,  original,
provocative,  and  fabulous.  Following  the  title  of "manifesto"  with
your  equally  confident  statement  of  worry  about the  title  expresses
perfectly the  comfort with  tensions that characterizes  the  entire piece.
I am  most  impressed  with  your  effort  to  articulate  and  then live
with  multiplicity  and tension  - as  urged  by postmodernists2 - de-
spite  appearances  of singularity  or  uniformity.  At  the  same  time,  I
am intrigued by the points at which you choose to limit the exploration
of  multiplicity,  perhaps  guided  by  the  substantive  commitments  of
feminism, and perhaps guided by a desire  to prevent multiplicity  itself
from  becoming  routine  and predictable.  I will  explain  both  parts  of
this reaction  as I also elaborate  on what I find new  and important  in
the Commentary.
With your  focus  on  the  female  body, you  join other  feminists  in
examining the allegedly most natural and immutable  source  of gender
difference. 3  By  addressing  the  legal meanings  of female  bodies,  you
frame  the  social  construction  discussion to  integrate  concrete  images,
* Professor  of Law,  Harvard  University.  At the  suggestion  of the  Editors of the  Harvard
Law  Review,  I  include  footnote  explanations  about  feminism,  postmodernism,  and  the  other
elements of Professor  Frug's Commentary.
1 This is  a response to Mary Joe Frug, A  Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfin-
ished Draft),  io5  HARV.  L. REV.  1045  (i992); Mary Joe  Frug  was at work  on  that article  at
the  time of her murder on  April 4,  1991.
2 See generally DAVID  HARVEY,  THE  CONDITION  OF  POSTMODERNITY  44-65  (x9go) (describ-
ing the focus  on  fluidity and multiplicity  in postmodern  trends in varied disciplines).
3 As Alison Jaggar has  recounted,  early feminist  theorists accepted the definition  of "human"
provided  by  male  theorists  and  tried  to  show  how  women  fit  that  definition.  See  ALISON
JAGGAR,  FEMINIST  POLITICS  AND  HUMAN  NATURE  2I  (1983).  Later feminist  theorists  turned
to  issues  such as  childbearing  and sexuality and began  to explore  and  celebrate  the  differences
between  men  and women,  particularly  those  based on the  differences between  male and female
bodies  and the cultural  meanings developed  around those differences.  See id. at 22.  Similarly,
feminist legal advocates working in the  I970S initially challenged  assertions of natural differences
between  men  and women  that had been  used to  deny women  rights enjoyed by  men,  see Ruth
B.  Ginsburg  & Barbara  Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 197os,
1989  U.  CHI.  LEGAL  F.  9,  11,  but  feminist  legal  advocates  working  in the  i98os  and  199os
emphasized  gender  difference.  Advocates  concerned  with  issues  of  reproduction  questioned
whether  gender-neutral  notions  can  accommodate  biological  and  cultural  differences  between
men  and women.  See id. at ig  & n.38 (citations omitted).  A parallel focus  on the female  body
has  animated  recent  feminist  work  in  the  humanities,  see  THE  FEMALE  BODY  IN  WESTERN
CULTURE:  CONTEMPORARY  PERSPECTIVES  -4  (Susan  R. Suleiman  ed.,  1986),  and especially  in
literary  and  psychoanalytic  theory,  see  JUDITH  BUTLER,  GENDER  TROUBLE:  FEMINISM  AND
THE  SUBVERSION  OF IDENTITY  79-141  (1990).
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lived  experiences,  and discoverable  ideologies  about  women.4  In the
early  i98Os,  we  talked  about  how  legal  feminists  seemed  divided
between  those  who  put  sexuality  at  the  center  of  feminist inquiries
and discussions  of women's  difference  and those  who  put maternity
at  the  center.5  By  simultaneously  addressing  the  "maternalization"
and  the  "sexualization"  of the  female  body,  you  resist  that  division.
Then, you  connect these themes with the "terrorization"  of the female
body and thereby build upon the  recent work by feminists on battery,
rape,  and  other  sorts  of  actual  and  threatened  violence  against
women. 6  Discussing  all  three  themes  together  provides  a fresh  and
4 Although  they address  differences  between  men  and  women,  most feminists  remain  com-
mitted  to  exposing  the  cultural  - that  is,  the  humanly  invented  - meanings  attributed  to
biological  differences  that have  been used  to assign  women  to roles subordinate  to or  separate
from  the  roles  assigned  to  men.  See  Anne  Fausto-Sterling,  Society  Writes  BiologylBiology
Constructs Gender,  1987  DAEDALUS  6I,  62-69  (examining cultural  understandings  of  gender
that  become  building  blocks  in a  supposedly  objective  account  of biology);  Introduction, in
FEMINIST  THEORY  IN  PRACTICE  AND  PROCESS  I,  4-5  (Micheline  R. Malson,  Jean  F.  O'Barr,
Sarah  Westphal-Wihl  & Mary  Wyer eds.,  1989)  [hereinafter  FEMINIST  THEORY] (recounting the
turn  to "social construction"  by feminists).  This  notion is  commonly  called the  "social construc-
tion"  of gender  and reflects  a broader  claim  about  the  cultural invention  of categories  used to
label people and assign  them to  particular social  positions as if that assignment were  compelled
by  their nature.  See  Kai T. Erikson,  Notes on the Sociology of Deviance, 9  Soc.  PROBS.  307,
308  (1962)  ("Deviance  is  not a  property  inherent in certain  forms of behavior;  it is  a property
conferred upon these  forms  by the  audiences  which directly  or indirectly witness  them.");  D.L.
Rosenhan,  On Being Sane  in  Insane Places,  179  SCI.  250,  257  (1973)  (reporting that,  in  an
experiment  to  test  attitudes  about  labeling,  a  person  identified  as  schizophrenic  could  not
persuade  observers  that he was not mentally ill).  Much  of this work resonates  with the theories
of  George  Herbert  Mead,  who  emphasized  the  impact  of observers'  perspectives  on  their per-
ceptions of other human  beings.  See GEORGE H.  MEAD,  SELECTED WRITINGS  134-41  (Andrew
J. Reck  ed.,  1964).
s  For  example,  Catharine  MacKinnon  puts  sexuality  at  the  center,  see  Catharine  A.
MacKinnon,  Sexuality, Pornography, and Method: "Pleasure Under Patriarchy," in FEMINISM
AND  POLITICAL  THEORY  207,  208  (Cass  R.  Sunstein  ed.,  i99o),  whereas  Robin  West  puts
maternity  and mothering at the center,  see Robin West,  Feminism, Critical Social Theory and
Law,  1989  U.  CHI.  LEGAL  F. 59,  8o-8i; see also Robin  West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55
U. CHI.  L. REV.  i,  70 (1988) (discussing pregnancy).  Of course, both perspectives share concerns
with male domination that frames women's difference from men,  unlike the "sameness" feminists
who  focus on  women's  similarity to men - as described  in  note 3  above - or those  who seek
to transcend  the sameness/difference  debate.  Several  legal  feminists  have  reviewed  the  debate
over sameness and difference arguments  in the specific  context of pregnancy and  maternity leave
policies.  See,  e.g.,  Lucinda  M.  Finley,  Transcending Equality Theory: A  Way  Out of the
Maternity and the  Workplace Debate,  86  COLUM.  L.  REv.  ii8,  1142-63  (1986);  Linda  J.
Krieger  & Patricia  N.  Cooney,  The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action
and the  Meaning of  Women's  Equality,  13  GOLDEN  GATE  U.  L.  REv.  513,  514-I5  (1983);
Wendy  W. Williams,  Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal TreatmentlSpecial Treatment
Debate, 13  N.Y.U.  REv.  L.  & SOC.  CHANGE  325  (1985).
6 See  e.g.,  ANDREA  DWORKIN,  Violence  Against  Women:  It  Breaks  the Heart, Also  the
Bones,  in  LETTERS  FROM  A  WAR  ZONE,  at  172,  175-76  (1988)  (discussing  the  frequency  of
violence against women);  SUSAN  ESTICH,  REAL RAPE (1987)  (examining rape);  SUSAN  SCECH-
TER,  WOMEN  AND  MALE  VIOLENCE:  THE VISIONS  AND  STRUGGLES  OF  THE BATTERED  WOM-
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powerful  analysis  in  your  case  studies  of  prostitution,  family  and
work,  and monogamy,  heterosexuality  and passivity.
I  do  offer  the  following questions  and suggestions.  Does it reflect
too great a preoccupation  with consistency to ask for a more persistent
analysis  of the  multiple  themes  in  each  of your  examples?  Can  you
pull  all three  themes  through the  section on family and  work and the
section  on  monogamy,  heterosexuality,  and passivity  the  way you  do
with  the  prostitution  discussion?  That discussion  so  effectively  illus-
trates  how  anti-prostitution  rules  work in  concert with  other rules  to
communicate  danger  to  and  about  women's  bodies,  the  illegality  of
sexuality  disconnected  from  marriage,  and the disapproval  of sexual
activity remote from reproduction.  Your method interplays the themes
to  show how  female bodies  are  unambiguously  situated  in space  and
time  and yet engender  multiple meanings  and possibilities.  But per-
haps you  mean to disrupt the idea that one method, or one coherently
applied  approach,  should  be  used  throughout  your  analysis.  If  so,
why not say so,  and say why?
In  contrast, your final  section  on the  anti-pornography  campaigns
explores  a  different  kind  of multiplicity  by challenging  the  presumed
meaning of pornography.  There,  the  multiple constructions  of female
bodies  is less apparent;  instead,  you emphasize  the centrality of wom-
en's  oppression  through  sexual  subordination. 7  What  about  terrori-
zation  and maternalization?  You  mention pornography's  link  to vio-
lence  against  women  and  its  parallel  to  women's  oppression  in  the
workplace.  This  implies  attention  to  the  several  strands  of women's
oppression.  Yet for  the  most part, your  discussion  adopts  the views
of MacKinnon  and  Dworkin  about the  centrality  of sexual  subordi-
nation  to  women's  oppression8  rather than  your  earlier,  more  multi-
faceted,  and complex  account  of the  sources  of women's  oppression.
Perhaps in this final section you mean to shift the locus of deconstruc-
tion  from  gender  to  political  strategy;  again,  if so,  why  not  say  so,
and say why?  Doing  so would  give  you  the  chance  to  acknowledge
this  additional  feature  of the  tension  between  a desire  to  hold  some
things  constant  and  a  desire  to  fracture  and  deconstruct  what seems
given  and immutable.
This  tension  between  the  fixed  or  located  and  the  multiple  or
diffuse recurs in two other contexts that you identify.  The first context
EN'S  MOVEMENT  i-8 (1982)  (discussing the  significant  achievements  of the  battered  woman's
movement).
7 See Frug, supra  note  I,  at 1072.
8 Catharine  MacKinnon  and Andrea  Dworkin  have  each written  analyses  of women's sub-
ordination  that identify the  conventional  practices  of and  ideas about  heterosexual  sexuality -
such  as  those  depicted  in  pornography  - as  central  to  the  domination  of women.  ANDREA
DWORKIN,  PORNOGRAPHY:  MEN  POSSESSING  WOMEN  (1981);  CATHARINE  A.  MACKINNON,
FEMINISM  UNMODIFIED  183-91  (1987).
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concerns  "womanhood" - is  there  something unifying  women  or are
women  in  our  plurality  too  different  to  be  united  on  the  basis  of
gender?  You imply a powerful parallel between "the body" and "wom-
anhood,"  which  both are  palpable  and yet also multiple and  mutable.
You warn  against seemingly  "natural" meanings  of sex  or gender  that
imply unity  because  the  very attribution  of "natural" meanings  hides
their  invention  by  humans  and  produces  political  immobilization. 9
But,  as  you  acknowledge,  deconstructive  techniques  that  emphasize
the  multiple  meanings  of  gender  and  womanhood  also  threaten  a
different  kind  of  political  paralysis:  the  classic  technique  of "divide
and  conquer"  splinters  the group  that is  trying  to  challenge  common
oppression.  Granted,  in  the  late twentieth  century  we  cannot  speak
as  nineteenth-century  activists  did of the "Woman movement."'1  We
encounter  variety  - and  even  conflicts  - among  women."1   But
reading  that  variety  as  so  profound  that  nothing  remains  common
across  all  women  makes  it seem  difficult  - if  not  impossible  - to
speak of women  as a group,  women with shared  interests,  or women
as a coherent political  concept.  You  suggest the  tension  between  the
unifying  and  multiple  conceptions  of  womanhood  and  women,  and
you  embrace  both.  It seems  "women"  has  too  much  historical  and
present-day  meaning  to  be  jeopardized  by  scholarly  deconstruction;
sex differences  exist and cannot be transcended. 12  Yet analysis  of the
competing  strands  of meaning  offers  a sense  of possibility  and  room
for  resisting imposed  meanings.  Actual  political  work building  upon
women's lived experiences,  you suggest, can "deploy the commonalities
among real women"  and "at the same time  challenge the  conventional
meanings  of  'woman'  that  sustain  the  subordinating  conditions  of
women's  lives"'13  I  see  the  tension,  and  I  am  given  hope  by  your
effort to embrace  both  sides.
The second  context  you  use  to  explore  the  tension  between  mul-
tiplicity  and  singularity  concerns  law  and  law  reform.  So  much  of
feminist political  work has sought to adopt legal tools  to produce new
and  improved,  reliable  reforms  of  official  rules  in  order  to  help
women. 14  Postmodern  work,  in contrast,  explores  the  multiplicity  of
9 See Frug, supra note  I,  at io5i.
10  See  NANcY  F.  COTT,  THE  GROUNDING  OF MODERN  FEMINISM  5 (i987) (contrasting the
nineteenth-century  "Woman  movement"  with  currently  diverse  strands  of the  women's  move-
ment).
11  See  ELIZABETH V.  SPELMAN,  INESSENTIAL  WOMAN:  PROBLEMS  OF EXCLUSION  IN  FEm-
INIST  THOUGHT  60-64  (1988)  (arguing that the  variety of women  should  not prevent  political
work  on  women's  issues  but that it should  stop  anyone from  claiming  to  speak  for  all women
without  having  engaged  in  collaborative  consultation  with  the  women  on  whose  behalf  she
claims  to speak).
12  See  Frug, supra note  i,  at 1051-52.
13  See  id. at 1059.
14 See Ginsburg  & Flagg,  supra note 3,  at 13-18 (discussing efforts to challenge the exclusion
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meanings  within  language  itself.1 5  Brought  to  law,  this postmodern
work  challenges  feminist  law  reform  by  interrogating  the  very terms
the feminists  want to  use,  terms such as  "woman."  You  urge readers
to  work  with  this  resulting  tension  and  not  get  lost in  either  side.
Thus,  law reformers should  acknowledge  and  welcome  the  fluidity of
language  and  meanings  and  participate  in  controversies  about  dis-
course rather than hoping to pin things  down.  Reformers  such as the
proponents  of the anti-pornography  ordinance  should  consider  a shift
from  the  focus  on  winning  to  a focus  on opening up  discussion  and
expanding  the  array  of images  of  women.16  This  message  is  even
more  pronounced  for  feminist  reformers  who  opposed  the  anti-por-
nography ordinance.' 7  That ordinance fractured women's groups and
simultaneously  drew  on  support  by  conservatives  who  oppose  other
feminist goals.  Welcoming multiplicity here means that feminists  who
are opposed  to  the anti-pornography  campaign  should  lighten up and
should  recognize  the benefits  of both  shifting  alliances  and  a "broad
theater  of political  involvement.' 8  At  the  same  time,  you  also  urge
of women  from  serving as  bartenders,  jurors,  and  estate  administrators,  and from  voting,  as
well as the  efforts to challenge  the exclusion  of men  from programs granting spousal benefits to
spouses  of  military  officers  and  from  child-in-care  social  security  benefits).  Challenging  the
exclusion  of men  reflected  the broader  strategy  of securing heightened  scrutiny for any  gender-
based  distinction on  the  theory that such scrutiny  would ultimately help  women.
Is  See  e.g.,  BUTLER,  supra note  3,  at 25-34,  142-49  (examining the  power  of language  to
encode  gender  meanings  and  discussing  postmodern  theorists  who  deconstruct  - take  apart
while  highlighting - those meanings);  CHRIS  WVEEDON,  FEMINIST  PRACTICE  AND  POSTSTRUC-
TURALIST  THEORY  81-85  (1987)  (comparing feminist-humanist  ideas that language can  unprob-
lematically express  experience  with  postmodern  notions  that language  hides  multiple meanings
and hidden  sources  of ideas  and  experience).  See  generally JONATHAN  CULLER,  ON  DECON-
STRUCTION  31-42  (1982)  (explaining postmodern  methods  of interpretation  that expose,  reverse,
and disassemble  dichotomous meanings implicit in texts);  ELIZABETH A.  MEESE,  CROSSING  THE
DOUBLE-CRoss  149-50  (1986)  (endorsing postmodern methods  for use  by feminists to  pursue an
infinite progression  that refuses  to identify a center  and is  always self-displacing, self-contradic-
tory, fluid,  and in motion).
16  See Frug, supra note  i,  at io67-68.
17  A  group of feminists  organized  to oppose the  anti-pornography  ordinances and produced
the Brief Amicus  Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship  Taskforce,  American  Booksellers Ass'n v.
Hudnut,  771  F.2d  303 (7th  Cir. 1985),  aff'd, 475  U.S.  oo1 (1986),  reprinted in Nan D.  Hunter
& Sylvia A. Law, Brief  Amici Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et al. in American
Booksellers Association  v. Hudnut,  21  U. MICH.  J.L. REF.  69,  76-136  (1987-1988).  Feminist
opponents  of  the  anti-pornography  campaign  have  also  written  scholarly  commentaries.  See
Lisa  Duggan,  Nan  Hunter  &  Carole  S.  Vance,  False Promises: Feminist Antipornography
Legislation in  the  U.S.,  in  WOMEN  AGAINST  CENSORSHIP  130,  145  (Varda Burstyn ed.,  1985)
(arguing  that pornography  is  not  harmful  enough  to justify  restrictions on  speech).  For  many
feminists,  the  anti-pornography  campaign  would  undermine  feminist  efforts  to  explore  and
experiment  with  sexuality.  See  Carole  S.  Vance,  Pleasure and Danger: Toward a Politics of
Sexuality, in  PLEASURE  AND  DANGER:  EXPLORING  FEMALE SEXUALITY  1, 6-7 (Carole S.  Vance
ed.,  1984)  (describing support among feminists  for sexual  autonomy).
18 Frug,  supra note  I,  at  1070.  Welcoming  this  challenge  to  the  conventional  political
groupings produced  by  the anti-pornography  campaigns  is related to - but still  differs from -
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postmodernists  to  resist  the  temptation  to  abandon  practical  law  re-
form struggles  as fruitless because of the  multiplicity of meanings,  and
you  encourage  them  instead  to join  the  constructive  impulse  of  the
reformers.  Postmodernists  can join reformers  in  their political  strug-
gles and still celebrate the gaps and conflicts  among possible meanings
of sexual identities  and differences.
It  is  quite  a  tour  de  force  to  turn  the  fight  between  these  two
groups  into  a  source  of  possibility  and  hope.  As  you  know,  many
reformer-types  feel  threatened  by what  they  experience  as  corrosive
and nihilist  postmodern  critiques;  many  postmodernists  seem  to  dis-
parage  law  reformers  as  naive  and  as  engaged  in  a  fruitless  and
misguided  effort to  freeze  meanings. 19  In your  opening statement  of
the  first  "principle,"  your discussion  of the  sex  workers'  proposals  to
reform  prostitution  laws,  and  your  analysis  of the  anti-pornography
campaigns,  you  coax  both  groups  to  learn  from  one  another.  This
takes  the  best  of  postmodernism  and  the  best  of feminism  without
trashing  either  one.
I have  two questions  that  mean to  explore  what is deliberate  and
what  is  not  deliberate  when  you  both  extend  and  stop  your  pursuit
of  multiplicity.  I  think  you  may  carry  that  pursuit  too  far  in  one
an  endorsement  of  the  consciousness-raising  aspects  of  the  anti-pornography  campaign.  See
Martha Minow,  Adjudicating  Differences: Conflicts Among Feminist  Lawyers, in CONFLICTS  IN
FEMINISM  149,  16o  (Marianne  Hirsch  &  Evelyn  F. Keller  eds.,  i9go).  I  wonder  if someone
who welcomes  disruption  of usual political alliances would also welcome a challenge to a single,
if complex,  view of women's  oppression.  See Frug, supra note  I,  at  io49-5o.
19  This  is  my  experience  with  study  groups  discussing  these  issues.  Some  of this  tension
appears in print.  As  one who  sympathizes  with reformers,  I  have written:
Unlike  the postmodernists,  whose  politics  often  remain  hidden  or  diffuse,  the  scholars
from  the  margin  [who  advocate  rights  for  women  and  people  of color]  feel  the  urgency
of  political  action  and  the  need  for  aspiration,  direction,  and  change  ....
[P]ostmodernists  may respond,  with  some  force,  that I  have  fallen  into  the  old  trap  of
consoling  myths  of reason,  and have  made  the  particular  mistake  of treating  identities
and  experiences  as  essential  and  grounded  rather  than  shifting  and  containing  their
opposites  . . . . [But  any]  theory  that  seems  to  produce  quiescence  and  a  sense  of
helplessness is  not good  enough.
Martha Minow,  Partial  Justice: Law and Minorities, in THE FATE  OF  LAw  is,  62-63  (Austin
Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns  eds.,  199i).  In contrast,  a postmodernist  has  written:
What I am now going to write  can easily be misread  as "postmodern modesties  replac[ing]
Marxist  certitudes,"  as  anti-libertarian  anti-feminist  irresponsible  talk.  This  is  the  risk
that one  must run  in order  to  understand  how  much  more complicated  it is  to  realize
the  responsibility  of playing  with  or working  with  fire than  to pretend that what  gives
light and warmth  does not  also destroy.
Gayatri  C.  Spivak,  Constitutions and Culture Studies, 2  YALE J.L.  & HUMAN.  133,  145-46
(i99O)  (quoting Jeffrey  C.  Goldfarb,  The Age  of Dissent: Democracy Crashes Party, VILLAGE
VOICE,  Oct. 1989 (Literary Supplement No. 79), at I8.  A similar argument appeared when scholars
of  color  challenged  the  critique  of rights  advanced  by  members  of the  conference  on  critical
legal studies.  Critical legal studies  scholars had charged  rights  discourse  as mind-numbing and
misguided  translations of complex human hopes;  scholars of color responded by defending  rights
as  empowering  and  unlikely  to delude  oppressed  people.  See  Symposium,  Minority Critiques
of the Critical  Legal Studies Movement,  22  HA~v.  C.R.-C.L.  L.  REV.  297  (1987).
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instance  and stop  short,  appropriately,  in  another,  but I  think  both
deserve  self-conscious  discussion.
First, let  us look  at your pursuit of multiplicity in  the  context  of
pornography.  In  general,  you  endorse  the  anti-pornography  cam-
paigns,  although  you  are  not  displeased  with  their ultimate  failures.
Yet could those campaigns  take place at all if their leaders  questioned
their understanding  of pornography  and pluralized the responses  read-
ers  have  to  pornography?  Your  discussion  of the  anti-pornography
campaigns,  along  with  your  discussions  of  prostitution,  work  and
family, and monogamy,  heterosexuality,  and passivity, challenge  "the
natural"  by  showing  the  fractures  and  contrasts  among  images  of
women  and  femaleness.  But your  anti-pornography  discussion  does
so not by unwinding the themes of terrorization,  maternalization,  and
sexualization,  nor  by  exploring  the  competing  and yet  still  women-
initiated perspectives  on the problem  (as the prostitution section does).
The  anti-pornography  section  challenges  the  conflation  of particular
bodily experiences  with subjective imagination  and the  merging of sex
with  gender  by  introducing  the  arresting  thought  that  pornography
works  - it  appeals  and  seduces,  entices  and  excites  - in  part  by
cross-sex  and  cross-gender  identification,  by  men  identifying  with
women  and  vice  versa.  As  your  argument  makes  explicit,  this  idea
explodes  the claims about sexual subordination  advanced  by the  anti-
pornography  campaigners.  For  if  women  can  and  do  identify  with
men  who sexually  subordinate  them,  and if men can  and  do identify
with women whom men subordinate,  then imagination transcends the
links  between  sexual  subordination  and gender  oppression.
Now, one could object that the gender hierarchy is still perpetuated
through  such  identification. 20  Indeed,  the  ordinance  explicitly  states
that sexual  subordination,  not subordination  of a biologically  female
person,  is the critical defect of condemnable  pornography.  Depictions
of men in  sexually subordinated  positions would  fall within  the ordi-
20  One  response  is  that  such  domination  and  subordination  is  inevitable,  an  idea  that A
Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto attributes  earlier  to post-Freudian,  Lacanian  theories  of
the  self.  See Frug,  supra note  I,  at 1070.  Therefore,  it is a mistake to challenge  depictions  of
what are inevitable  constructions of self within hierarchial relationships.  See id.  Unlike Freud,
who  tied  his  theories  of  human  psychology  to  biological  drives,  Jacques  Lacan  shifted  the
psychological  inquiry to the allocation of meaning and being through language structured within
a patriarchal society.  See Jacques Lacan,  The Meaning  of the Phallus, in FEMININE  SEXUALITY:
JACQUES  LACAN  AND  THE  ECOLE  FREUDIENNE  74,  78-83  (Juliet Mitchell  & Jacqueline  Rose
eds., Jacqueline  Rose trans.,  1983); see also BUTLER,  supra note  3,  at 43-57 (discussing Lacan).
But not everyone agrees  with Lacan.  Indeed,  acknowledging  and  embracing the contemporary
fights about theories  of the self means leaving open the  possibility that Lacan's theory is wrong.
See Frug, supra note  I,  at  07o.  And if that theory is wrong, pornography  may well contribute
importantly  to the  perpetuation  of subordinating  relationships.  So  keeping  an  open  mind  on
the question of "the self"  means  keeping an  open mind on the  significance  of pornography.
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nance's  terms. 21  Other  than  undermining  the  rhetorical  and  concep-
tual  coherence  of the  anti-pornography  campaigns,  then,  what  does
this notion  of cross-gender  identification  offer?  The  deeper  goal,  you
suggest,  is  to  challenge  "the  polarization  of the  world  by gender."22
Exploring  each  of our  capacities  to  identify with  people  of different
genders  could  help.  But  my question  is  whether  exploring  such  ca-
pacities  in  this  context  would  undermine  the  very  notion  of gender
subordination  that  the  anti-pornography  campaign,  and  feminists
more  generally,  challenge. 23  If  we  can  each  imagine  ourselves  on
various  sides  of  subordinating  relationships,  what  is  so  bad  about
subordination?  If we  can  each  pretend  to  take turns  with power,  or
transcend  our  positions  through  imagination,  why  is  oppression  de-
serving  of critique?
My second  question  is  related.  The manifesto  displays a commit-
ment to deconstruct - to  take apart apparent  dichotomies  and  show
how  apparent  polarities  need  or  compliment  one  another  or  exclude
other important alternatives.  I have already commented on a seeming
shift  in  the  focus  for  deconstruction.  In  the  first  three  cases  it  is
gender,  whereas  in  the  anti-pornography  discussion,  the  focus  is the
definition  of and readers' responses  to pornography.  My question here
is  why  do  you  not deconstruct  the  notion  of subordination  itself?  I
think I have  an answer;  I think that your commitment to deconstruc-
tion  is  not  for  its  own  sake  or  to  produce  a  mindlessly  perpetual
analytic  machine  that fractures  concepts  and ideas.  I think  that you
are  a feminist using  techniques  of postmodernism,  just  as  you  are  a
feminist using law.24  Yours is a "postmodern feminist manifesto,"  not
21  See  The  Minneapolis  Civil Rights  Ordinance,  With  Proposed Feminist Pornography
Amendments,  2  CONST.  COMMENTARY  I8I,  184  (1985)  (reprinting  proposed  amendments  to
MINNEAPOLIS,  MINN.,  CODE OF ORDINANCES,  tit. 7,  chs.  139 & 14)  ("The use of men, children,
or  transsexuals in  the place  of women  ...  is  pornography  for  purposes  of ...  this  statute.");
see also INDIANAPOLIS  & MARION  COUNTY,  IND.,  CODE §§  i6-I,  -17,  -18,  -24,  -26 to  -28  (1984),
reprinted in Symposium on Pornography  2o NEw  ENG.  L.  REV.  767-72  app.  (x984-i985).
22 Frug, supra note  x,  at  1075.
23  The anti-pornography  campaign  as framed by its feminist supporters  was premised on the
idea  that the  subordination and oppression  of women operates  through male  dominance  that is
itself  sexual.  MacKinnon  argues  specifically that rape,  battery,  sexual harassment,  and  prosti-
tution,  along  with  pornography,  are  manifestations  and  confirmations  of the  forms  of  power
men  hold  over women.  MacKinnon,  supra note  5,  at 208.  Even  those  feminists  who  do  not
agree  with  this  particular  theory  or  with  the  focus  on  pornography  challenge  the  persistent
power  that at least  some  men  are  able to wield  in ways  that hurt most women.  My  question
concerns  whether  exploring  the  capacities  of  each  person  to identify  with  persons  of different
sexes  undermines such  analyses  of and struggles against  male subordination  of women.
24  There  are  parallel  dangers  for feminists  in  being  drawn  into  these  other  enterprises -
postmodernism  or law - and falling into their rhythms  and  assumptions  rather than  pursuing
our  own.  Compare Jean  B.  Elshtain, Antigone's Daughters, in  FREEDOM,  FEMINISM,  AND  THE
STATE  6I,  61  (Wendy  McElroy ed.,  2d ed.  199I)  (exploring the  dangers of feminist reliance on
1092] 110o3
HeinOnline -- 105 Harv. L. Rev.  1103 1991-1992HARVARD  LAW  REVIEW
a feminist postmodern  manifesto.  You want to be  in control  of your
postmodernism just as Madonna wants  to assert her control  over her
dress,  her images,  her  fantasies,  and  her life. 2 5
But  why don't  you  talk about just  this:  how you  mean  to  be  in
charge  as  you  use  postmodernism?  Why  not  articulate  more  fully
what you  mean  by oppression  and subordination?  Might that expose
the  analysis  to  the  deconstructive  impulses  of some  readers?  What
happens  in the  absence  of direct  discussion?  Do you  adopt  Barbara
Johnson's  notion that examining ambiguities  always  enables liberating
challenge  to  the  established  order?26  Or  do  you  find  helpful  Sandra
Harding's  idea  that  postmodernism  risks  a  relativism  that  conflicts
with  feminist commitments  to  political  engagement,  and  with  a con-
tinuing ability  to name,  authoritatively,  and to fight, effectively,  what
is  oppressive?27  Or is  any talk  about how  we  know that  oppression
is  bad  and what  it  is  in  fact just beside  the  point?  Does  such  talk
risk falling into  verbal games that we  know only too well,  the  games
that give  "academic"  a bad  name?28  Are  irony  and playfulness  your
ways  of remaining  in  control and guarding  against  the Pac-Man  ten-
dency of postmodern  methods,  or are they signs that you have already
been  attacked and absorbed  by those  methods?
Actually,  I  think  your irony,  playfulness,  and eminently  personal
style29  bring  delight and  reassurance that your self is there,  intact,  in
control,  and enjoying  engagement  with  the  reader.  Your  "popover"-
type  comments30  are  disruptive  in  the  best sense:  they  resist the  lull
of seamlessness  in  the prose and the  illusion of authorlessness.  Your
confessions and self-reflections  are like the  refining lines on an etching
that  make  the  figure  more  palpable  while  complicating  its  actual
boundaries.  I  get a  charge  thinking about "premenstrual"  and "post-
menopausal" and certain four-letter  words appearing in a law review.
I  love  the  fact  that the "spell-check"  on  my computer  software  does
not  recognize  many  of your  words.  These  aspects  of your  style  ex-
the  state) with Linda Alcoff,  Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism:  The Identity Crisis
in  Feminist Theory,  in FEMINIST  THEORY,  supra note  4,  at  295,  295-326  (exploring  post-
structuralist  challenges to feminists).
25  See Frug, supra note  I,  at 1053.
26  See BARBARA JOHNSON,  A  WORLD  OF  DIFFERENCE  30-31  (1987).
27  See Sandra  Harding,  The Instability of the Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory,  in
FEMINIST  THEORY,  supra note  4, at  I5,  26-27.
28  Cf. Arthur  A.  Leff,  Unspeakable Ethics,  Unnatural Law,  i979  DuKE  L.J.  1229,  1249
(responding  to the intellectual  notion  that "everything is  up  for grabs").
29  Mary Joe  Frug  discusses  attention  to style  and  worries  about  meeting  the  postmodern
demands  for self-consciousness  about  style.  See  Frug, supra note  I,  at 1047-48.  Her  talents
for inventing a personal  style characterized  her dress,  her speech,  her teaching,  and her friend-
ships,  as well as her  scholarship.
30 Mary Joe  writes:  "Like a shooting star or last night's  popovers,  [the]  genius  [of postmod-
ernism] was  the surprise of its appearance."  Id.  at 1045.
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emplify the  idea of opening things  up that your  analysis pursues,  just
as your  own dress  and direct questions  to people  do.
I get  more  out  of  the text  with  each  rereading.  The  last time  I
read it I noticed  some zingy  phrases,  such as "Vanilla-Sex  Gestapo"3 1
and  "Madonna's  bambino  puts  her  in  charge"32  (which  echoes  ironi-
cally  Madonna's  assertion  that  "'I'm in  charge'").33  Re-reading  gives
me the  chance to be a different reader  each time,  and to imagine  how
a feminist critical  of using law and  a male reader  with  a chip  on  his
shoulder  could  perceive  the  arguments.34  Perhaps  a feminist  critical
of law reform  would  find the  piece  a teasing  way to  entice reformers
into postmodernism.  Perhaps a  male reader with a  chip on  his shoul-
der would  be looking for clues  to justify his anger, and he would find
them in your insistent refusal  to be pinned  down and to abide  by law
review conventions.
Re-reading  also  prompts  further  questions.  Why  do  you  find
Madonna  believable  when  she  says  she  is  in  control?  Is  wearing  a
leather skirt resistance to the  fear of looking  like a whore  or a parody
of prostitute  attire?  Did  you  use  the  word  "terrifying"  deliberately
when you  write:  "[T]he  polarization  of the  feminist  legal  community
during  the  ordinance  campaign  was  terrifying  to  me"?35  Your  very
next  sentence  remarkably  pulls  resistance  to  terror  from  your  own
confident  hope  in  challenge,  difference,  and  change:  "However,  I be-
lieve the divisions the campaign produced among feminists  constituted
an important challenge  to  the  polarization  of the  world by gender. "36
It  is your  confidence,  I confess,  that moves  me even  more  than  your
analysis, your hope  even more than your deconstructions.  And I hope
to emulate that confidence  as I face  what  is terrifying  in this world.
As always,
Martha
31  Id.  at  1070.
32  Id.  at xo56.
33  Id.  at  1053  (quoting  Madonna).
34  Cf.  Mary Joe  Frug,  Re-Reading Contracts: A  Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook,
34  Ara.  U.  L.  REv.  io65,  io65  (1985)  (contending that "readers' views about  gender affect their
understanding  of a law  casebook").
35  Frug, supra note  i,  at  1074.
3  Id. at  1075.
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